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A frequently given version of the argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen
against the completeness of the quantum mechanical description is criticized as
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1. INTRODUCTION
The argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR), advanced by these au-
thors in support of the thesis that quantummechanics cannot provide a complete
description of a physical system, has been receiving close attention in founda-
tional studies and debates on quantum mechanics ever since the famous paper
of EPR appeared in 1935 [1]. Not lacking in subtlety, the EPR argument was
bound to be misrepresented frequently in the extensive writings on the subject.
A particular version of the EPR argument, analyzed critically as a misrepresen-
tation already more than 25 years ago by Hooker [2], who classified it as “the
third related EPR argument,” has been appearing persistently in the literature,
especially in that aimed at a more general audience,1 and in popular accounts.2
The present paper is occasioned by a clearly stated occurrence of this version in
a book on the relatively recent but already influential “consistent-histories,” or
0Address since July 1999: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 1095
Willowdale Road, Morgantown, WV 26505, USA; e-mail: vhnizdo@cdc.gov
1For example, even in the admirable analysis and interpretation of the philosophy of N.
Bohr by Folse [3].
2See, for example, Ref. [4].
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“logical,” revision [5–7] of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics, written by one of its originators R. Omne`s [8].
The important difference between the original EPR argument and, to use
Hooker’s classification, “the third related” version will be pointed out using the
presentation of Omne`s; moreover, it will be argued anew that “the third related”
version is a misrepresentation that loses the cogency of the argument as it was
put forward originally.3 This will agree with the findings of Hooker [2], but for
different reasons than those he advanced; Hooker’s reasons will be criticized as
flawed on the physical grounds.
2. THE ORIGINAL EPR ARGUMENT
As Omne`s says himself in his book, nothing can replace the direct reading of the
original paper of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen when studying their argument
against the completeness of the quantum mechanical description. Following this
advice should not be an onerous task as this famous paper has only four pages,
in which the argument is developed clearly and succinctly—and the reader is
entreated to peruse the paper to gain a first-hand knowledge of the matter under
the present discussion. The following three paragraphs are a synopsis of the
EPR argument, with comments that attempt to facilitate an appreciation of the
intuitive physical context behind the formal logical structure of the argument.
A satisfactory theory should be complete, and a necessary condition for the
completeness of a theory is that it has a counterpart for every “element of phys-
ical reality.” A sufficient criterion for recognizing an element of physical reality
that corresponds to some physical quantity is satisfied when one can predict
with certainty the value of that quantity without in any way disturbing the sys-
tem to which the quantity pertains. Such a criterion aims at defining rigorously
an empirically discernable symptom of the existence of physical reality that is
independent of the observer and his measurements. For a conserved physical
quantity, an intuitive justification for this criterion can be given easily along
the following lines: if one can, without in any way disturbing the given system,
predict the value of a conserved quantity pertaining to the system, the quantity
must have had that value from the time of the last external disturbance of the
system, and it will keep that value as long as the system remains undisturbed,
in particular before any measurement is performed on the system, including
a measurement of the quantity concerned. Generally, considering also noncon-
serving quantities, the EPR reality criterion is a condition that one would accept
intuitively as guaranteeing, when it is fulfilled, that a measurement of the quan-
tity concerned only reveals the quantity’s value, which exists independently of
whether the measurement is performed or not.
3Of course, the EPR argument is compelling only when their concept of reality is accepted,
see Secs. 2 and 3.
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Having formulated their demands on a complete theory in terms of elements
of physical reality that can be identified as such according to a well-defined
criterion, EPR note that the wavefunction Ψ(x1, x2) of a system consisting of
two noninteracting subsystems that, however, interacted with each other in
the past, in general can be expanded in terms of complete sets un(x1) and
vs(x1) of eigenfunctions corresponding to different physical quantities A and B,
respectively, of system 1:
Ψ(x1, x2) =
∑
n
ψn(x2)un(x1) =
∑
s
φs(x2)vs(x1). (1)
Here, the functions ψn(x2) and φs(x2) can be regarded as the coefficients in
the two expansions. The summations above run over at least two terms, and
so the state (1) is now often called “entangled,”4 in the sense that it does
not factorize into a single product of two functions where each depends only
on the degrees of freedom of one of the subsystems. EPR point out that one
can assign different wavefunctions to subsystem 2 by performing different local
measurements on subsystem 1. This is because of what they term “the reduction
of the wave packet” upon a measurement, now usually called the collapse of the
wavefunction: when the quantity A is measured on subsystem 1 and found to
have a value ak, subsystem 1 is left in a state described by the wavefunction
uk(x1), collapsing the wavefunction (1) into a single term ψk(x2)uk(x1), which
means that subsystem 2 is left in a state described (to within a constant) by a
wavefunction ψk(x2); but if the quantity B, instead of A, had been chosen to be
measured and a value br obtained, the state of the system would have collapsed
to the state φr(x2)vr(x1), leaving subsystem 2 in a different state φr(x2).
The two wavefunctions ψk and φr may happen to be eigenfunctions of two
noncommuting operators corresponding to conjugate physical quantities P and
Q, respectively. EPR illustrate this by considering a two-particle system pre-
pared in a state in which, along a given direction, the difference of the position
coordinates of the particles and the sum of their momenta have sharp values x0
and 0, respectively:5
Ψ(x1, x2) = δ(x2 − x1 − x0). (2)
For simplicity, they assume only a one-dimensional motion, and use a non-
normalizable delta function instead of a more realistic wave packet that would
have a finite spread in position and momentum. The above entangled state can
be written as
Ψ(x1, x2) =
∫
ψp(x2)up(x1) dp, (3)
4This terminology goes back to Schro¨dinger [9].
5As observed immediately by Bohr in his reply to EPR [10], such a state is perfectly
legitimate in quantum mechanics because the operators of the difference in the positions and
of the sum of the momenta of two particles commute.
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where
up(x1) =
1
2pih¯
exp(ipx1/h¯) and ψp(x2) = exp[−ip(x2 − x0)/h¯] (4)
are momentum eigenfunctions of particles 1 and 2 with eigenvalues p and −p,
respectively; it can be written also as
Ψ(x1, x2) =
∫
φx(x2)vx(x1) dx, (5)
where
vx(x1) = δ(x1 − x) and φx(x2) = δ(x2 − x− x0), (6)
are position eigenfunctions of particles 1 and 2 with eigenvalues x and x + x0,
respectively. Now when a measurement of the momentum of particle 1 yields
a value p, one knows with certainty that the momentum of particle 2 must be
P = −p, because on that measurement the wavefunction (3) collapses to the
state ψp(x2)up(x1), where ψp(x2), the state in which particle 2 is left, is the
eigenfunction in (4) of P with the eigenvalue −p. But one is free to measure the
position of particle 1, instead of its momentum. If it was then decided to measure
the former, on the resulting value x of such a measurement one could have
predicted with certainty that the position of particle 2 is Q = x0+x, because the
wavefunction (5) would have collapsed to the state φx(x2)vx(x1), where φx(x2),
the state of particle 2, is the eigenfunction in (6) of Q with the eigenvalue x0+x.
EPR assert that the momentum P and position Q of particle 2 must possess
simultaneous reality according to their reality criterion, as the predictions of P
and Q can be done by measurements on the noninteracting particle 1 and thus
without disturbing particle 2 in any way.6 The formalism of quantum mechanics,
however, does not allow a state in which a particle has simultaneously a definite
momentum and a definite position, and so EPR conclude that the quantum-
mechanical description is not complete. While EPR admit that one cannot
predict the position and momentum of particle 2 simultaneously, they counter
this objection by asserting that the reality of the position and momentum of
particle 2 cannot, in any “reasonable definition of reality,” depend on the process
of measurement on particle 1 carried out without disturbing particle 2. In other
words, they argue that the simultaneous reality of the position and momentum of
particle 2 is established already by the possibility of predicting either of the two
quantities on the result of a measurement of either the position or momentum of
the noninteracting particle 1. In drawing this conclusion, they use not only their
reality criterion, but also rely on their firm conviction that in any “reasonable”
concept of physical reality, the real state of a system must be independent of
what may happen to another system, from which the system in question is well
separated and with which it has no interaction.
6This can be ensured by having the particle separation x0 sufficiently great; curiously, EPR
do not mention explicitly this simple measure.
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In 1951, Bohm [11] employed in the EPR argument a more convenient system
of two spin-1/2 particles prepared in the entangled state of zero total spin J ,
|JM〉 = |00〉 =
√
1
2
[∣∣1
2
〉(1)
nˆ
∣∣− 12〉(2)nˆ −
∣∣− 12〉(1)nˆ
∣∣ 1
2
〉(2)
nˆ
]
, (7)
where
∣∣± 12〉(i)nˆ is the spin state of particle i with the projection of its spin on the
axis along an arbitrary unit vector nˆ equal to ± 12 . The particles are assumed
to be far away from each other; for example, they could be the s-wave products
of the decay of a quasibound two-spin-1/2-particle system of zero total angular
momentum. Since its introduction, the Bohm’s version has been used almost
exclusively in the literature as it has the advantage of using quantities that do
not have continuous spectra and are conserved, thus freeing the discussion from
non-essential aspects such as those connected with the non-normalizability of
wavefunctions and the time evolution of the system, which may distract from
the gist of the argument. Using the state (7), the EPR argument runs then
as follows. The z-component s2z of the spin of particle 2 is an element of
reality because it can be predicted, without disturbing particle 2 in any way, by
measuring the z-component s1z of the spin of the distant particle 1: if such a
measurement yields s1z = +
1
2 (or −
1
2 ), it follows from the zero-total-spin state
(7), with nˆ = zˆ, that s2z must then equal −
1
2 (or +
1
2 ). But the x-component s2x
of the spin of particle 2 must be an element of reality, too, as one could predict
it similarly by performing an alternative measurement of the x-component s1x
of the spin of particle 1 and using nˆ = xˆ in (7). The quantum-mechanical
description then must be incomplete as it does not allow a state in which both
the z-component and x-component of the spin of a particle have definite values.
A comment on the role of the collapse of the wavefunction in the EPR
argument seems now in order. While EPR talk about the collapse of the wave-
functions (1), (3) and (5) into single products of wavefunctions of subsystems 1
and 2 as a result of suitable measurements on subsystem 1, it can be seen easily
that the collapse of the wavefunction does not need to be evoked explicitly in
order to carry the argument through. The joint observables of the difference
in the positions and of the sum of the momenta of two particles can be each
measured by measuring the relevant observables on each of the two particles
separately: the particles’ individual positions for the first joint observable, and
their individual momenta for the second one.7 But as the state (2) is an eigen-
state of both the joint observables, the result of the measurement of the position
or the momentum of particle 1, together with the knowledge of the eigenvalues
of the joint observables in the state (2), i.e., the position difference x0 and the
7However, such measurements of joint observables cannot be used to prepare the composite
system in an entangled state like the one of Eq. (2); an experimental procedure that would
prepare such an entangled state has been described by Bohr [10]. Moreover, such measure-
ments, even when they are of the repeatable type, would disentangle a given entangled state
of the composite system—and this is made use of in the argument of the rest of this section.
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momentum sum 0, enables one to predict the value of the position or momentum
of particle 2 already on the universally accepted meaning of an eigenstate and
its eigenvalues—namely that, in such a state, a measurement of the observable
(which is here of the joint type) pertaining to an eigenvalue of the state must
yield with certainty that eigenvalue. Similarly, no collapse of the zero-total-
spin state (7) is needed explicitly in the argument, only the fact that the total
spin is zero and thus s1z + s2z = s1x + s2x = 0. Of course, it may be useful
to couch the discussion in terms of suitable wavefunction collapses, but such
collapses can be deduced here from the above mentioned meaning of an eigen-
state and its eigenvalues with no need of postulating them as logically primary.8
3. “THE THIRD RELATED” ARGUMENT
The EPR argument employs measurements, performed or contemplated, on only
one of the two subsystems, say particle 1, of the system. So far as particle
2 is concerned, its state is not directly measured, it is rather predicted on
the result of a direct measurement on particle 1. However, the presentation
of the EPR argument by Omne`s employs measurements on both particles: in
the Bohm’s version, a measurement of the z-component s1z of particle 1 and
a subsequent measurement (say at a time t) of the spin of particle 2 along
another direction, say a measurement of the x-component s2x. On the result
of the measurement of s1z one can predict the value of the z-component s2z of
the spin of particle 2 and thus, according to the EPR reality criterion, the value
of s2z of particle 2 is an element of physical reality, which, obviously, it will
remain to be so until the time t of the direct measurement of s2x. But the latter
measurement assigns to particle 2 a definite value of s2x, and so, at the time
t, particle 2 must have definite values of both s2z and s2x, which is in direct
conflict with the possibilities of the quantum-mechanical description. There is
no fundamental reason, apart from that of convenience, for not performing the
above measurements of s1z and s2x simultaneously; in fact, when the original
example with position and momentum quantities is used in this version of the
EPR argument, the position of one of the particles and the momentum of the
other should be measured simultaneously to circumvent complications due to
the time evolution of the system. Versions of the EPR argument that employ
measurements on both the two subsystems belong to the class identified by
8 Here it is noted that the “no-collapse measurements” proposed by Home and Whitaker
[12], which are supposed to leave a system always in the state that the system had before
measurement, can be ruled out using a similar argument. Indeed, if an entangled state of a
composite system remained unchanged after the measurement of a suitable observable on one
of its two subsystems, a subsequent measurement of the corresponding observable on the other
subsystem would not necessarily yield a value that results in the eigenvalue of the relevant
joint observable in the entangled state when the value is combined with the measurement
result on the first subsystem.
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Hooker and labeled by him as “the third related EPR argument.”9
The essential aspect in which “the third related” and original EPR argu-
ments differ is that the former aims at establishing the possibility of simultane-
ous determination of two conjugate quantities, whereas in the latter it is argued
for simultaneous reality (or existence) of such quantities. As is well known, one
can find easily measurement procedures that assign simultaneously arbitrarily
precise values to position and momentum, but they all have a retrospective
character in the sense that they never prepare a state in which these values are
the initial conditions.10 The uncertainty principle refers to the preparation of a
state, which has testable consequences, rather than to a retrospective measure-
ment with no predictive power. Einstein was well aware of that, and his failed
pre-EPR attempts at disproving the uncertainty principle were aimed at find-
ing experimental procedures that would lead to a simultaneous determination of
two conjugate quantities in such a way that it would have a predictive power.11
The EPR argument differs from the previous attempts of Einstein in not trying
to show that one can determine simultaneously two conjugate quantities; EPR
must have realized that simultaneous measurements of the position of one of the
particles and the momentum of the other cannot lead to a determination with
predictive power of the simultaneous position and momentum of any of the two
particles. In fact, EPR steer carefully from what would be “the third related
argument”: while they accept that the two conjugate quantities of particle 2
cannot be predicted at the same time because only one of the two alternative
measurements on the correlated particle 1 can be performed actually, they do
not counter this by proposing to perform the other measurement on particle 2
(this would be “the third related argument”). EPR argue “only” for simulta-
neous reality of the two conjugate quantities, using, with no need to perform
in the end any measurements, their reality criterion in conjunction with their
firm belief that the real state of a system cannot depend upon the process of
local measurement performed on another system, well separated from the first
system so that the measurement cannot disturb the latter. Bohr clearly under-
stood that well, and aimed his reply to EPR accordingly at their concept of
reality [10].
“The third related” EPR argument is thus not only a misrepresentation of
the original EPR argument, but also lacks cogency: the simultaneous deter-
mination of two conjugate quantities it purports to establish has no predictive
power; it cannot lead to a physical state in which the values of two conjugate
9A recent coincidence-measurement presentation of the EPR argument by Domingos et al.
[13] thus falls in this class also; this paper has been commented on critically in Ref. [14].
10Heisenberg discussed such retrospective measurements on an example of the time-of-flight
method of velocity measurement already in 1930 [15], and Bohr commented on such a method
of velocity measurement even earlier, in his historic Como paper (Ref. [16], p. 66 in Atomic
Theory and the Description of Nature). A more recent discussion of retrospective measure-
ments can be found in Ref. [17].
11Einstein’s famous clock-in-the-box thought experiment is perhaps the best example, see
Ref. [18].
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quantities are among its initial conditions and the knowledge of which would
enable one to predict the future time development of the given system. To use
the original EPR example with the conjugate quantities of position and mo-
mentum, a momentum measurement on particle 2 results in a loss of its spatial
coordination with respect to the frame of reference, as demanded by the uncer-
tainty principle, and the correlation it had with the position of particle 1, which
could be used to determine its position, is thus lost irretrievably. Similarly,
concerning now particle 1, its position measurement destroys irrecoverably the
correlation it had with the momentum of particle 2 and which could be used
to determine its momentum on the result of the momentum measurement on
particle 2.12 The prediction of the value of a quantity pertaining to a given
particle on the result of a measurement of the similar quantity on the other
particle, together with the simultaneous measurement of the conjugate quantity
on the given particle, thus gives the simultaneous values of the two conjugate
quantities of the given particle only in the retrospective sense.
Hooker in his excellent study of the Einstein–Bohr debate argues also against
the cogency of “the third related” EPR argument,13 but for reasons that are
criticized presently as flawed. Hooker asserts that in fact one cannot perform
sufficiently accurately the simultaneous measurements of the position of particle
1 and the momentum of particle 2 because there is, as Bohr has shown [10,18],
an uncontrollable transfer of momentum to the common coordinate frame as
a result of the position measurement on particle 1. While it is certainly true
that an accurate position measurement must lead to an uncontrollable transfer
of momentum to the body that serves as a coordinate frame of reference, this
circumstance presents no practical difficulty when the frame is sufficiently mas-
sive. Indeed, the momentum that a sufficiently massive frame absorbs in the
position measurement of particle 1 results in the frame acquiring a negligible
velocity, and thus the space-time coordination of any auxiliary body that is used
in the determination of the momentum of particle 2 is not affected.14 As Bohr
always stressed [18], proper space-time coordination uses a frame and clocks
that can absorb the inevitable and uncontrollable transfers of momentum and
12Bohr stresses this point in his reply to EPR [10].
13See Ref. [2], Sec. 5 and pp. 223–224.
14A comment that has no direct bearing on the issues at hand seems nevertheless worth
making here. To achieve a position determination of such an auxiliary body without affecting
its momentum, Hooker proposes to use a parallel beam of light to illuminate a position pointer
attached to the body, with a light detector placed behind the pointer, see Ref. [2], pp. 215–217.
It can be seen easily, however, that also in such a procedure there will be an uncontrollable
transfer of momentum to the body on account of the diffraction of light by the pointer’s
edge. Such diffraction determines the ultimate accuracy of the position measurement and, as
it involves an uncontrollable change in the direction of the incident photons, it leads to an
uncontrollable transfer of momentum to the body along the direction in which its position
is measured. Fortunately, the momentum uncertainty introduced by a position measurement
does not affect the accuracy of the velocity determination by the time-of-flight method, in
the context of which Hooker makes the above proposal, if the time interval between the two
position measurements needed in such a method is sufficiently great [15].
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energy without being affected in their role as a space-time framework. Thus,
contrary to Hooker’s assertion, the position of particle 1 and the momentum of
particle 2 can be measured simultaneously and, in principle, with arbitrary ac-
curacy. However, the assignment of simultaneous values to conjugate quantities
of any of the two particles, to which such measurements lead in a procedure that
follows “the third related” EPR argument, amounts simply to a retrospective
measurement with no testable consequences.
4. CONCLUDING SUMMARY
A frequently given version of the EPR argument against the completeness of
the quantum mechanical description, called by Hooker “the third related” EPR
argument, was criticized as a misrepresentation of the original argument. The
cogency of “the third related” argument itself was disputed on the grounds that
it aims at establishing the possibility of a determination of simultaneous values
of conjugate quantities, rather, as in the original EPR argument, at establishing
their simultaneous reality, and that as such it amounts only to a scheme of a
retrospective measurement.
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